Taiwan’s admiration for Japan has always existed beneath the surface, but in recent years it has surged to unprecedented highs. A nationwide survey conducted in late 2024 found that 76 per cent of Taiwanese now describe Japan as their “favourite country.” Another poll recorded that 70 per cent believe Taiwan should align most closely with Japan, ahead of the United States and far ahead of China. Even earlier surveys from 2022 showed pro-Japan sentiment nearing 75 per cent, confirming a long-term shift rather than a temporary spike. For most observers, this is framed as a matter of identity and democratic affinity. But for Beijing, these numbers are not mere feelings—they are strategic data. When three quarters of the Taiwanese population identify more with Japan than with China, Beijing concludes that unification is becoming increasingly implausible. Even worse, from China’s perspective, Taiwan appears to be embedding itself in the Tokyo–Washington security orbit. That perception triggers consequences that stretch far beyond the Taiwan Strait and indirectly alter the balance of power across Indo-China. Japan and Taiwan anchor the northern segment of the First Island Chain, long viewed in Beijing as a U.S.-aligned barrier designed to contain China’s rise. When Taiwanese public opinion becomes overwhelmingly pro-Japan, China sees the chain tightening—not just militarily but psychologically. A population that identifies this strongly with Japan cannot, in Beijing’s view, be politically reclaimed without enormous risk. The symbolic meaning is profound: Taiwan is drifting away, and Japan is becoming its guardian. When China feels pressure in the north, its response is to reinforce the south. Indo-China—Myanmar, Laos, and Cambodia—becomes Beijing’s geopolitical cushion. These countries offer land corridors to the Indian Ocean, strategic proximity to key sea lanes, and political systems that are more aligned, or at least more manageable, from China’s perspective. As Taiwan and Japan move closer, China deepens its influence in Indo-China to ensure that no strategic vacuum emerges on its southern flank. Yet Indo-China presents a paradox. The region is also the epicentre of sprawling cyber-scam syndicates responsible for billions of dollars in global losses. Chinese nationals are often victims—sometimes trafficked into scam compounds, other times targeted by online fraud rings operating in Myanmar, Laos, and Cambodia. For Beijing, this criminal ecosystem is a domestic political embarrassment and an international burden. Thus, China’s increasing penetration of Indo-China becomes intertwined with its campaign to pressure local militaries and police forces to dismantle these illicit networks. What emerges is a deeper and more forceful Chinese footprint in Indo-China—driven partly by crime control but ultimately by geopolitics. China’s engagement becomes more intrusive, more complex, and more strategic. Indo-China’s governments, dependent on Chinese investment and diplomatic backing, frequently acquiesce. As China consolidates influence in these states, the balance of power in the sub-region tilts further toward Beijing. This shift is not the result of Indo-China’s decisions. It is the result of Taiwan’s. As Taiwanese identity moves closer to Japan, China binds Indo-China more tightly to its own orbit. The logic is straightforward: if the Japan–Taiwan partnership hardens […]
3天前
Under the slogan of the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” the Xi Jinping leadership is striving to become the next hegemonic power, replacing the current hegemon, the United States. One of the most effective means of achieving this goal is through influence operations known as “United Front Work” (UFW). China’s expanding influence through UFW has recently been noted not only in East Asia, but also in Europe, Africa, Latin America, and other regions. News of the UK’s banning of a Chinese businessman from the country for the connections he built with politicians as well as with a member of the British royal family is still fresh in our memory. UFW in Okinawa Prefecture The focus of UFW activities in Japan is Okinawa Prefecture, which borders Taiwan. In recent years, the Chinese government has increased political, economic, and cultural exchanges with the prefecture. The following two objectives can be cited as reasons for this. First, there is a political estrangement between the Japanese and US governments and the Okinawa Prefectural Government. As is well known, Xi Jinping has increased his efforts to unify Taiwan and expand China’s maritime power. If a military conflict were to occur in the Taiwan Strait, Chinese forces could attack US military bases in Okinawa and invade the Senkaku Islands (known as the Diaoyu Islands in China) and other outlying islands in Okinawa Prefecture. Japan and its ally, the United States, are improving their deterrent capabilities to prevent armed conflict across the Taiwan Strait. In response, China is exploiting the issue of the US military bases in Okinawa and the backlash against the buildup of the Self-Defense Forces in the Nansei Islands (known in Japan as the “Southwest Shift”) to intensify anti-Japanese and anti-US sentiment among Okinawans. The goal is to deter and hinder Japan and the US from improving their capabilities to deter China. Second, there is Xi Jinping’s personal interest in exchanges between China and Okinawa. Since the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in October 2022, Xi’s personal rule has been firmly established. He is also predicted to extend his administration for a fourth term beginning in 2027. Conversely, Xi developed his personal interest in the historical ties between Okinawa and China during his time in Fujian Province from the mid-1980s to the early 2000s. Consequently, policy issues related to Okinawa appear to have become a tool in the competition among sub-leaders seeking to curry favor with Xi Jinping, who has a personal attachment to the region. To win the bureaucratic race and curry favor with the supreme leader, leaders from various bureaucratic organizations and departments across China have begun to engage with the Okinawa issue. In China, people involved in UFW activities often establish political relationships with specific individuals or organizations under the guise of economic or academic exchanges. UFW activities targeting Okinawa Prefecture follow the same pattern. In the economic field, the Japanese people primarily targeted are those who play a role as bridges between Japan and China at […]
2月前
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